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SYMPOSIUM

CREATIVITY AND THE LAW

INTRODUCTION:
CREATIVITY AND THE LAW
Mark P. McKenna*
Creativity is on the American mind. President Obama routinely
suggests that creativity and ingenuity are the keys to America's economic future.' Bill Gates emphasizes the power of creativity to solve
the world's most pressing, and most difficult, problems. 2 But the creativity story is, of late, usually bleakly told: indeed, a recent Newsweek
cover story proclaimed a "Creativity Crisis."'3 Last November, a group
of twelve academics gathered at the Notre Dame Law School to consider law's role in this story. What is creativity, and how does it map
onto legal concepts like originality, novelty, or non-obviousness?
What should law, and particularly intellectual property (IP) law, do to
promote creativity? What can it do? Whose creativity does the law
currently favor? These are big, interdisciplinary questions, and for
that reason the symposium brought together experts from several
fields: psychologists, an economist, and law professors with backgrounds in a variety of other disciplines, including anthropology,
chemistry, comparative literature, and history of science. Each of the
contributions in this volume can stand alone as an important contribution to the literature, but collectively they represent perhaps the
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Thanks to all the symposium
participants, and to Megan Dilhoff, whose terrific work made it all happen.
1 See, e.g., Jon Garcia, Obama and a Dozen Techie Titans: Creativity & Ingenuity Will
Double Exports & Create Millions of Jobs, AacNEWS BLOG (Feb. 18, 2011, 3:45 AM),

http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2011/02/obama-and-a-dozen-techietitans-creativity-ingenuity-will-double-exports-create-millions-of-jobs.html.
2

Bill Gates, Unleashingthe Power of Creativity, NPR (Sept. 19, 2005), http://www.

npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4853839.
3

at

44,

Po Bronson & Ashley Merryman, The Creativity Crisis, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2010,

available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/ 1O/the-creativity-crisis.html.
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strongest collection of essays on creativity and the law that has been
assembled in one place.
Olufunmilayo Arewa highlights a visual-textual bias that prevents
copyright law from fully recognizing the wide range of musical creativity. 4 As Arewa notes, "music copyright both reflect[s] and ha[s] an
impact on sociocultural contexts of musical creation, dissemination,
performance, and consumption." 5 In particular, Arewa argues that
copyright pays insufficient attention to actual musical practices, where
improvisation is a core aspect of creativity. "Improvisational practices," Arewa explains, "are... closely associated with innovation and
creativity in varied contexts," yet copyright "largely fails to facilitate
the creation of improvised works." 6 It fails because copyright overemphasizes written musical texts and fixates on threats to ownership and
compensation for creators of those works, ignoring the risk to unwritten creative practices pervasive in jazz and other musical forms. The
visual-textual bias, in other words, rewards certain creators, and certain types of creativity, at the expense of other creators and different
forms of creativity.
Mario Biagioli takes aim at the foundational myth of the "romantic genius," arguing that the kind of creativity attributed to the creative genius "can in fact easily undermine the very notion of property it
is deemed to have established."'7 Biagioli attributes much of the
romantic genius notion to Fichte, whose concept of authorial property, Biagioi argues, depends on a "radical a priori argument" that the
author's "form," as distinct from its physical aspect and even the content of the book (the ideas it presents), is literally unalienable. For
Fichte, the physical aspect of the book is fully alienable, and the content is potentially alienable, subject to the reader's investment of her
own labor. But the book's form, as a reflection of the distinct thought
patterns of the author, cannot be alienated, for to understand the
author's form is to assimilate it into your own pattern of thought,
which is equally unique and distinct as that of the author. 8 But so
understood, Biagioli argues, the romantic genius conception of
4 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Creativity, Improvisation, and Risk: Copyright and Musical
Innovation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1829 (2011).
5 Id. at 1838.
6 Id. at 1841.
7 Mario Biagioli, Genius Against Copyright: Revisiting Fichte's Proof of the Illegality
of Reprinting, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847, 1848 (2011) ("[T]he very same dimensions that make genius into such a powerful tool for establishing copyright are also
capable of undermining it. Genius is copyright's pharmakon-simultaneously a cure

and a poison.").
8 Id. at 1851.
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authorship supports only protection against verbatim copying-for
anything less than verbatim copying must entail investment of the
reader's own labor and assimilation into her own thoughts.9 This creates an interesting paradox for Biagioli: "it is not only that a book or
painting does not contain an intangible personal expression"-the
tangible object contains only traces of that expression as discerned by
the audience-"but that the personal expression is rendered 'unemployed' by having done its job so well."' 0 Then it is only by "watering
down originality-making it less specific through the doctrine of 'substantial similarity' so as to cover more than the literal original instantiation of a work-that the 'personal expression' ceases to be an
absent or remote principle for the legitimation of the author's property and the illegality of reprinting."11
Abraham Drassinower plays the role of skeptic, calling into question the idea-which he argues is "among the most fundamental and
most established" in North American copyright discourse-that copyright is, or should be, concerned with promoting creativity. 12 Drassinower notes the irony that copyright minimalists and maximalists
argue on the same instrumentalist terrain, all the while copyright has
continually expanded. This is no accident, according to Drassinower:
"Instrumentalist discourse is... part and parcel of the very expansion
that minimalism seeks to counter"1 3 because minimalists accept that
copyright is to be evaluated along the same incentive and dissemination-function dimensions as maximalists; they simply have a different
view of the calculus.
In this vein, the minimalist complaint against copyright expansion is
not a complaint against that expansion per se. It is rather about the
effects of that expansion. If copyright expansion were shown to be
conducive to the public interest in production and dissemination,
then there would be nothing wrong with it, at least from a copyright
perspective. The dispute between maximalists and minimalists is in
14
this respect largely empirical.
And, of course, given the general unavailability of empirical evidence
that could definitely resolve the matter, there is little hope that the
minimalist instrumentalist view can constrain copyright. Drassinower's encouragement to minimalists is therefore to embrace a
9
10
11

Id. at 1861-63.
Id. at 1866.
Id.

12 Abraham Drassinower, A Note on Incentives, Rights, and the PublicDomain in Copyright Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1869, 1869 (2011).

13
14

Id. at 1870.
Id. at 1873.
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rights-based account of copyright, which he argues has a constitutive
account of the public domain that is lacking in the instrumentalist
account.

15

Jeanne Fromer's contribution considers trademark law's encouragement of creativity, which she argues has helped justify expansion
16
of trademark law "in ways unmoored from core trademark theory."
Fromer notes that creativity seems, in large measure, incidental to
trademark law: trademark rights are a function of use, for example, so
creation of a mark is not relevant to the question of ownership, at
least in terms of who owns the mark and what actions are necessary to
endow someone with rights. 17 But that is to look at creativity too narrowly, according to Fromer, since trademark law does reward a different kind of creativity, even if indirectly, namely creation of the sourcedesignating link between a mark and the goods or services with which
it is used.18 And, as Fromer argues, much of trademark law's modern
expansion-from recognition of infringement claims based on noncompeting uses to dilution claims' 9-reflects its solicitude for more
distinctive marks, and ultimately its focus on brand meaning as distinct from the narrower source-related meaning. 20 This brand meaning, of course, is primarily creative content developed through
advertising and linked to a particular signifier in consumer memory.
Thus, whether or not creativity plays a role in trademark theory, in
practice modern trademark doctrine promotes creative development
of brand personality.
David Galenson offers a unique explanation for the remarkable
changes in advanced art over the last century. 2 1 Galenson begins with
George Heard Hamilton's observation that the theory and practice of
15 Id. at 1884 ("To the extent that she is herself an author, the plaintiff cannot
consistently deny the legitimacy of the use [of her work for purposes of criticism]
because [the critic's] own claim is, after all, an authorship claim.").
16 Jeanne C. Fromer, The Role of Creativity in Trademark Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1885, 1887 (2011).
17 As Fromer suggests, trademark law does incentivize creativity in developing a
trademark by treating suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful terms as inherently distinctive, making them protectable without evidence of secondary meaning, and by considering those marks to be stronger marks and therefore entided to a broader scope of
protection. See id. at 1907. Indeed, courts often even distinguish among inherently
distinctive terms, finding suggestive terms weaker than arbitrary or fanciful terms. Id.
18 Id. at 1909.
19 To this list I would add post-sale confusion, which aims to protect prestige and
image built through advertising. See id. at 1917-18.
20 Id. at 1920.
21 David W. Galenson, Market Structure and Innovation: The Case of Modern Art, 86
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1921 (2011).
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art changed radically in the half century between 1886 and the beginning of the Second World War, and he asks: " [W] hy did this radical
transformation begin in the 1880s, and reach its peak in 1907?"
Galenson frames his answer with his own insightful distinction
between experimental and conceptual innovators. 22 Experimental
innovators, he explains, "seek to record visual perceptions," but
"[t] heir goals are imprecise, so they proceed tentatively, by trial and
error." 23 Because of their approach, experimental innovators tend to
"build their skills gradually, and their innovations generally emerge
piecemeal, late in their careers." 24 Conceptual innovators, by contrast, "express ideas or emotions. Their goals can be stated precisely,
25
so they usually plan their works, and execute them systematically."
And conceptual innovators' "innovations appear suddenly, as a new
idea... produces a result quite different not only from other artists'
work, but also from their own previous work." 26 Moreover, "[r] adical
conceptual innovations depend on the ability to make conspicuous
departures from existing conventions," precisely what we observe in
art practice during the era of Galenson's focus. 2 7 Looking through

this lens, Galenson observes that the market for art changed dramatically near the end of the nineteenth century when a number of prominent artists, "frustrated at their lack of success in having their
paintings accepted by the Salon," organized an independent exhibition that included the paintings of twenty-nine artists. 28 This was the

beginning of the end of the Salon's "monopoly of the ability to present fine art in a setting that critics and the public would accept as
legitimate." 29 It was, in other words, the beginning of a more competitive market for advanced art, and one that freed conceptual innovators to bring forward radically new art-"works that would not have
been recognized as art in any earlier era."30° Artists initiated a structural change in the market for art, and the new, more competitive
market was more conducive to conceptual innovation.
22 Id. at 1922-23. Galenson developed these categories in his fantastic book, Old
Masters and Young Geniuses. DAVID GALENSON, OLD MASTERS AND YOUNG GENIUSES
(2006).
23 Galenson, supra note 21, at 1923.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
27 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

28
29

Id. at 1924.
Id.

30

Id. at 1931.
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Roberta Kwall explores creativity in Jewish law from a cultural
analysis perspective, "argu[ing] that from an early stage in the development of Jewish law, its inherent creativity derive [d] from its confrontation with outside cultural influences."3 1 More particularly,
Kwall investigates the influence of surrounding cultures on Jewish law
and "develops the argument that the need for adaptation to the surrounding environment ensured the inherent creativity of Jewish law's
development and application." 32 Yet after reviewing this history and
the role of cultural influences, Kwall concludes that "the familiar and
successful pattern of acculturation that historically insured a creative
Jewish legal system is no longer viable in the sociological milieu in
which most American Jews live."'33 The antidote to this dilemma,
Kwall argues, is for American Jews to develop a better "understanding
34
of the process of creativity in the development of Jewish law."

Michael Madison, like Drassinower, questions the centrality of
creativity in copyright discourse, suggesting that conservation, preservation, and stewardship of knowledge ought to play a more prominent
role.3 5 "A legal framework for durable forms of knowledge is partly

baked into the structure of IP law," Madison notes, "but negatively,
and to a limited degree." 36 Knowledge is preserved by excluding
some matter from protection and by limiting the duration of those
rights (ostensibly, at least). What is lacking is a positive role for law in
"preserv[ing] intangible forms of creativity and innovation produced
by prior generations." 37 Yet "[s] ociety needs durable, fixed intangible
things both because society itself needs to be largely stable and fixed,
and because it also needs those durable, fixed things precisely so that
it can change them, and change itself. ' 38 Madison therefore offers
"an introductory account of th[e] mechanics [of curating products of
the mind]" that is grounded in the idea of cultural commons.3 9 This
framework puts context and institutions at the forefront, for as
Madison uses the concept, a commons framework is an institutional
approach to knowledge curation that "embraces influences on outcomes that are grounded not only in legal rights and obligations but
31

Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Creativity and CulturalInfluence in EarlyJewish Law, 86
L. REv. 1933, 1935 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1954.
Michael J. Madison, Knowledge Curation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957 (2011).
Id. at 1958.
Id. at 1961.
Id. at 1962.
Id. at 1961.
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33
34
35
36
37
38
39
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also in social and institutional practices as well as individual interests,
in patterned and unpatterned activity at the individual level.., and in
40
intersections between material and intangible form."
Greg Mandel brings recent learning from psychological research
into contact with intellectual property law and notes that, despite the
fact it is "the primary area through which the law seeks to motivate
and regulate human creativity," intellectual property law is generally
oblivious to, and sometimes inconsistent with, the lessons of the psychological literature. 4 1 Mandel suggests that this literature offers particularly important insights regarding large-scale collaborative
creativity, the most extended form of which may be "open and collaborative peer production., 42 Yet because most of the psychological theories of creative motivation were developed in the context of
individual and small-group environments, extending the lessons to
the large-scale context requires some adaptation. Here Mandel
focuses on the need for development of intrinsic motivation in largescale projects, which might come from participants' identification
with the goals of the project.4 3 Intellectual property could serve a valuable role in creating appropriate motivation as well, particularly
44
where it can be seen as a reward based on the group's creativity.
R. Keith Sawyer evaluates ten implicit beliefs about creativity,
which he collectively refers to as the "Western cultural model of creativity," in light of scientific research about creativity. 45 Each of these
beliefs, Sawyer concludes, is false, or at least highly misleading, and he
draws on creativity research to propose an alternative view of creativity. Echoing one theme from Greg Mandel's essay, for example, Sawyer debunks the implicit belief that people are more creative when
they work alone, showing instead that groups are critically important
to creativity-in fact increasingly so. 46 Yet the belief that creativity is
an individualistic enterprise has significant effect on the structure of
patent and copyright law, just as the idea that creativity comes in a
"flash" of insight can lead us to minimize the extent to which an
author's work is influenced by what came before or encourage us to
40

Id. at 1983.

41 Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and
the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 1999 (2011).
42

Id. at 2001.

43

Id. at 2024.

44

Id. at 2025.

45

R. Keith Sawyer, The Western Cultural Model of Creativity: Its Influence on IntellecNOTRE DAME L. REV. 2027 (2011).

tual Property Law, 86
46

Id. at 2040 (showing that collaboration is both widespread and increasing).

1826

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:5

search for a single moment at which an invention is conceived. 47
These beliefs about creativity, however, are not universal; indeed, as
Sawyer argues, they are "deeply connected to the individualism of
most Western cultures. '' 48 Sawyer pushes us to get beyond these
beliefs, which prevent us from structuring the law to optimally promote creativity.
Sean Seymore argues that "atypical" inventions-those in which
the inventive process or a technical aspect of the invention does not
conform to an established legal standard in patent law (accidental
inventions) or the technical underpinnings of the invention depart
from well-established paradigms (incredible inventions)-are vulnerable to a disconnect between the patent system and certain technical
communities. 49 Seymore's particular focus is on chemical and pharmaceutical inventions, which he sees as importantly different from
those that were typical during the Industrial Age, when many patent
doctrines emerged. 50 Unlike mechanical inventions, inventions in the
chemical and pharmaceutical areas might arise by accident, while patent law constructs the inventive process as one with discrete conception and reduction to practice phases. Similarly, patent law's
operability requirement might pose a significant challenge to inventors who make significant technological breakthroughs that might
seem unbelievable at first blush. 5 1 In the contexts of both accidental
and incredible inventions, Seymore argues, the patent system should
evolve to better accommodate the actual practices of the communities
in which these innovations arise.
Jessica Silbey offers us a preview of her book-length empirical
project, in which she relates the creation narratives of artists, scien52
tists, engineers, and their lawyers, agents, and business partners.
These creators' views allow us to go beyond intellectual property law's
assumptions about incentives and to understand how creators think of
their own work. Silbey first "traces the language of beginnings," relaying how her interviewees describe embarking on a life's work in art or
47 See id. at 2030 (discussing the erroneous belief that "creative people get their
great idea in a flash of insight").

48
49
50
51

Id. at 2053.
Sean B. Seymore, Atypical Inventions, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2057 (2011).
Id. at 2060.
Id. at 2070-71 (noting that the PTO and courts do not keep up with the cut-

ting edge of science, which creates a lag during which patents might be denied on
inventions not yet understood).

52 Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and "WorkMakes-Work," Two Stages in the Creative Processesof Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2091 (2011).
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science in terms of "(1) serendipity or luck (taking advantage of a
moment); (2) intrinsic or natural forces (inevitability of a discovery);
(3) play and pleasure (freedom and joy of exploration); and (4) need
or urgency (puzzles or problems to solve)."53 At the point of executing particular creative or innovative works, however, Silbey's interviewees describe their daily work "as a craft-laborious and painstaking,
sometimes mechanical and tiresome, although also rhythmic and
comforting." 54 Notably absent from most creators' accounts at either
stage are references to commercialization or economic incentives.
But this is not to say that intellectual property is completely absent
from the overall picture: "those people or entities that control the
research and development plans [within firms] are incentivized by the
existence of IP rights at the beginning, even if the individual creators
are not."55 In this sense, Silbey's work is more confirmation of the
disconnect between the rhetoric of intellectual property, which
focuses on incentives to creators, and the reality that IP does most of
its work at the firm level (and often more specifically at the intermediary level).

56

And finally, Rebecca Tushnet focuses on the genre of viddingthe making of "vids," which consist of "re-edited footage from television shows and movies, set to music that directs viewers' attention and
guides them through the revisioned images." 57 Vidding is a species of
what more broadly is considered "remix" or "mashup," and copyright
law has struggled to make sense of these works generally because they
58
seem simultaneously to take too much, and threaten too much,
while allegedly offering nothing new. Vids generate particulary acute
reactions of this sort, according to Tushnet, since vidders are a largely
female community engaged in activities that are associated with femininity. There is "[g]eneral legal discomfort with the unauthorized
creativity expressed by vids," despite the fact that "their critical inter53
54

Id. at 2102.
Id. at 2114.

55

Id. at 2123.

56

Id.; see also, Sawyer, supra note 45, at 2047-48 (quoting Rebecca Tushnet's

response to Sawyer's inquiry at the symposium: "This [idea that creativity is a personality trait] is part of the mythical romantic authorship that distracts attention from the
role of the publisher and the intermediaries (like editors) who are in fact copyright's

greatest beneficiaries, precisely because individuals don't need copyright's incentives
as much.").
57 Rebecca Tushnet, Scary Monsters: Hybrids, Mashups, and Other Illegitimate Children, 86 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 2133, 2135 (2011).
58 See id. at 2149-50 ("Remix, with its connotations of chopping up, loss of con-

trol, and ungovernability, can be seen as a kind of horror, especially since horror also
makes very clear the associations between women and monsters.").
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ventions are understandable as transformative.."59 This is no accident,
as "excessiveness and femininity have been associated in Western culture, as have copying and femininity. '60 Indeed, "[a]nxiety about
female creativity and denigration of domains where women are active
creative forces have a long history." 61 But vidding takes place within a
62
community of vidders, and it is, in Tushnet's words, about power.
"Attention to how these very real, very active artists produce and discuss their work would aid us in developing the multiple perspectives
on creativity that would reflect more accurately what art is like"-and,
I might add, who makes art-"than the current economic, incentive63
based conception."
Read on-you won't be disappointed.

59 Id. at 2138.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 2154.
63 Id. at 2156.

